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Against Crude Semantic Realism?




A common way of spelling out a factualist conception of mean-
ing, what appears to be the canonical option, is Semantic Realism.
I shall not discuss Semantic Realism in general, but a crude version
of it, one that holds that there is 1) exactly one relation between
proper names and objects (the word-referent relation), 2) that this
relation is paradigmatic for semantics, and 3) that the relation is
not normative, i.e., does not entail what one should say if it holds.
According to this view, the prime fact about meaning is the word-
referent relation which Frege had introduced for complete expressions
minus a specific conception of linguistic normativity that often goes
together with it. In the first section, Semantic Realism and linguis-
tic normativity will be introduced in George Wilson’s (1994) terms.
Crude Semantic Realism will then be explained as a departure from
these specific notions. The second section will present linguistic con-
siderations against it. The third section will present philosophical
considerations which attempt to show that Crude Semantic Realism
cannot fully explain the fundamental character of meaning. The
fourth, and last, section draws a moral for the agenda of Semantic
Realism.
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II A Guide to Descending into Crude Semantic Realism
In 1982 Saul Kripke presented a sceptical challenge for any possi-
ble conception of meaning (Kripke, 1982). He argued that the chal-
lenge can be gathered from various writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein
and that there is also a solution for the challenge. The ’sceptical’ so-
lution that Kripke presents us with has usually been read as a form of
non-factualism about meaning. Colin McGinn (1984), Paul Boghos-
sian (1989) and Crispin Wright (1984; 2001, ch 4) have championed
this reading and Alexander Miller (2009) has resourcefully defended
its general gist against George Wilson’s dissenting view by present-
ing an amended non-factualist reading. The present discussion does
not depend on details about Kripke’s challenge, his solution, or the
debate it has produced. Rather, it will take the intuition behind the
dissent and independently assess a specific elaboration of it.
George Wilson (1994) has argued that Kripke’s solution features
a factualism about meaning. The reason why the standard reading
is wrong is because it fails to identify the exact target of the sceptical
challenge. At the heart of Wilson’s alternative reading lies the view
that Kripke’s sceptic assumes Classical Realism about meaning-facts,
whereas Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not. In other words, Kripke’s
Wittgenstein uses the sceptical challenge to reject Classical Realism,
which Wilson (1994, p. 244) exemplifies as follows—call this instance
‘Semantic Realism’:1
Let ‘a’ denote an object o, ‘φ’ a property φ and let F be the (pos-
sible) state of affairs of o’s being φ. Then:
(1) ‘a is φ’ is true if and only if F obtains
The reason why, according to Wilson (1994, p. 239), Kripke’s
Wittgenstein wants to reject Semantic Realism is because it leads
to a substantial scepticism together with the intuition that meaning
is normative. The Classical Realist has the following conception of
linguistic normativity—call it ‘Ns’:
1Note that I have changed Wilson’s notation. I am indebted to Kai Bu¨ttel




If X means something by a term ‘φ’ or ‘a’, then there is a set of
properties P1 . . . Pn of at least one o in the domain that govern the
correct application of ‘φ’ or ‘a’ for X.
The reason why linguistic normativity and Semantic Realism go
together well is that the normativity thesis explains what is special
about the relation between word and referent: the relation governs
correctness and, ultimately, explains meaning because meaning is
inherently normative, i.e., the properties governing correct applica-
tions entail prescriptive rules for applications of terms. Furthermore,
only because of the fact that meaning is inherently normative does
the word-world relation turn out to be primitive, for prescriptions
are commonly assumed not to be reducible to descriptions.
It does not matter for present purposes how Ns and Semantic
Realism give raise to a sceptical challenge and whether this is an
accurate reading of Kripke (or Wittgenstein). What is important
is that one might want to preserve some form of Semantic Realism.
After all, ‘The banana is green’ is true iff the banana is green and false
if, for example, it is already yellow (or brown). One might find this
intuition very powerful and, therefore, accept that Ns does not hold
in order to save it from scepticism. This amounts to Crude Semantic
Realism—the position that Classical Semantic Realism is true and
that meaning is not normative, that Ns is false if it is read as entailing
any prescriptive rules. The resulting position is crude, because it
dispenses with the idea that the word-referent relation is primitive
due to the normativity of meaning. The question then is whether
Crude Semantic Realism can, without significant alterations, make
sense of the word-referent relation in a way that is substantial enough
to fully explain meaning. Before we come to that assessment, let me
introduce a proposal that classifies as Crude Semantic Realism.
Paul Boghossian (2005) and Anandi Hattiangadi (2006, 2007)
have, amongst others, forcefully argued against the normativity of
meaning and have, thus, adopted Crude Semantic Realism. Only
Hattiangadi’s proposal will play a role here in order to keep the
argument concise and illustrate the general strategy against Crude
Semantic Realism.
Hattiangadi (2007, pp. 179–180), after having presented an in-
sightful discussion of most of the debate on the fundamental issues
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that Kripke had raised, introduces a distinction which, if applied
to Wilson’s definition of linguistic normativity, reveals an ambiguity.
The word ‘govern’ in Ns can mean two things: 1) X applies ‘φ’ or
‘a’ correctly, 2) X should apply ‘φ’ or ‘a’ correctly. On the first read-
ing it implies, at best, a constitutive rule, while it clearly implies a
prescription on the second reading. On Hattiangadi’s view, the first
reading is plausible, but the second one has a bogus result: scepti-
cism about meaning. To get rid of prescriptive rules in semantics,
she introduces a new notion, one which only allows constitutive rules:
‘Linguistic Norm-Relativity’:2, 3
(2) X means φ by ‘φ’→∀o(X applies ‘φ’ correctly to o ↔ o is φ)
As far as the sceptical challenge is concerned, Hattiangadi seems,
for reasons not to be rehearsed here, warranted in assuming that
Crude Semantic Realism is a plausible conception of meaning.
So far, Crude Semantic Realism has been introduced and the
motivation for it has been sketched. An assessment on independent
grounds follows in the next two sections. The leading question is: can
Crude Semantic Realism make sense of the word-referent relation in
a way that is substantial enough to fully explain meaning?
III Spanish DOM and Japanese Occurrence
In order to formulate the linguistic considerations against Crude
Semantic Realism, more details on Hattiangadi’s position are needed.
It seems useful to start with her general reasons for rejecting seman-
tic non-factualism. The worry here is that it is hard to make sense
of a substantial conception of meaning without basing the idea that
somebody means something on the assumption that ’the judgements
or statements of our semantic discourse [i.e., the practice of ascribing
meaning] are legitimate in some sense—either true in a weakly defla-
tionary sense or justified’ (Hattiangadi, 2007, p. 102). After all, if it
was not usually the case that people are right in meaning something
2From here on I shall only talk about the application of predicates like ‘φ’ to
properties, I assume that the lessons for naming can easily be draw from this.
3Note that I have altered Hattiangadi’s notation as well.
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rather than nothing, one could hardly claim that the underlying con-
ception of meaning was substantial enough, because meaning any-
thing, then, would be arbitrary. In other words, without anything
like Linguistic Norm-Relativity or another conception of correctness,
a notion of meaning can hardly be said to be interesting at all.
Semantic non-factualism must, thus, appear incoherent, as it
seemingly requires a notion of correctness without presupposing that
there is anything that can be correct or incorrect beforehand. There
must be a content that can be true or false behind every statement
or judgement in semantic discourse if semantic discourse is not to be
arbitrary. Hattiangadi is therefore committed to the idea that judge-
ments and statements always have a semantic content, one that can
be true or false. So far so good.
Consider what she says about judgements. In her discussion
of answers to the sceptical challenge she assesses Crispin Wright’s
judgement-dependent account of meaning and intention (cf. Wright,
2004), according to which the extension of the truth-predicate for
claims about what we mean or intend depends on the form of judge-
ment we base these claims on. Such judgements are therefore called
’extension-determining’. Her objection to this proposal is as follows:
The problem, quite simply, is that Wright appeals to my judge-
ments, and the sceptic can always question the contents of those
judgements. The sceptic can accept that John’s intention to [θ] is
constituted by his judgement that he intends to [θ], she can still
ask what makes it true that John judges that he intends to [θ] (Hat-
tiangadi, 2007, p. 159).
Hattiangadi supposes here a difference between the constitution
of semantic content and its actual interpretation, the truth (or false-
hood) of any ‘θ’ that has semantic content. This amounts to the
claim, if seen together with the definition of Semantic Realism, that
semantic content must be constituted independently of what is actu-
ally true.4 In other words, there is a semantic content which refers to
states of affairs in virtue of containing names and predicates which,
considered by themselves, refer to objects and properties—reference
4See also Hattiangadi (2007, pp. 12–13) where she explicitly makes the inde-
pendence claim.
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(the word-referent relation) is the bridge between the two uncon-
nected shores: content and states of affairs. On that view, an a
priori covariation of some judgement that one intends to θ (or any
other candidate content of judgement) and some states of affairs, as
Wright proposed, is never licit.
Now, Wright claims that there is a class of judgements for which
there is no difference between constitution of content and interpreta-
tion of content. Such a content must, under ideal circumstances, be
actual if it is possible at all—which is to say that it must be neces-
sary. If there are necessarily true judgements, the constitution of the
semantic content and its interpretation happen at once. Compelling
examples, ideally not restricted to any idiosyncratic philosophical
account of judgement (such as Wright’s), are needed to suggest that
there is more about semantic content and, thus, meaning, than Crude
Semantic Realism can handle. Finding such examples and arguing
































“There is a cat”
The linguist George Bossong has introduced the concept of ‘differ-
ential object marking’ (dom), a linguistic feature of more than 300
languages (Bossong, 1984). Examples (3) and (4) are well-formed
sentences in Spanish. (3) contains the dom ‘a’ which marks ‘Luc´ıa’
as a living being, (4) does not require such a marker, because pic-
tures are not living beings. If Lucia was a sports car, there would
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be no marker in (3) either. Of relevance here is that every semantic
content has a syntactic structure, it must be (at least) well-formed
to be true or false. In both examples, the well-formed sentence con-
veys semantic information to anybody who understands Spanish by
using one grammatical form rather than another. In the Japanese
sentences (5) and (6) we find a similar grammatical feature. The oc-
currence of living beings (such as cats) requires the predicate ‘imasu’,
while the occurrence of an object requires ‘arimasu’.5
Based on such examples, philosophers of language and theoretical
linguists rooted in recent developments of Chomskian grammar have
argued that such grammatical findings do tell us something about
conceptual capacities.6 They argue that the conceptual capacity to
distinguish, for example, between living and non-living beings is a
feature of our grammatical capacities. More specifically, Wolfram
Hinzen (2007) has argued that certain lexical items, amongst which
we may want to include the predicate ‘living being’, have an internal
structure which determines how the item is to be combined with
others when well-formed expressions in a language are built, but
that structure itself is said to have no compositional semantics—i.e.,
it must be taken as primitive. I shall explore this line of thought
with as few Chomskian assumptions as possible in order to come up
with a counterexample to Hattiangadi.
Since Noam Chomsky’s first mention of language acquisition in
relation to grammatical form (Chomsky, 1965), it has become in-
creasingly well corroborated that grammatical features are, by and
large, innate. But what does ‘innate’ mean here? The notion does
not require much work if we follow Gabriel Segal:
The work is done by the negative clause: ‘not acquired by a psy-
chological process’. Thus empiricists propose that their chosen ex-
planandum is acquired by: induction, abduction, deduction, per-
ception, statistical inference, conditioning etc... Nativists, say: no,
5Note that trees and plants in general do not count as living being when it
comes to the grammatical distinction between animate and inanimate objects.
One might, thus, prefer to say that there is a grammatical distinction between
sentient and non-sentient beings. I shall, however, not make use of those terms.
6I write from a minimalist point of view as introduced in Lasnik and
Uriagereka (2005), but I hope that other views associated with Noam Chomsky
find that my arguments pass muster.
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it was acquired some other way. It has to be considered primitive
from the psychological point of view—something that we assume
that the learner has before the process of learning begins. If alien
scientists programmed us with UG [Universal Grammar] when we
were foetuses, then I take it that nativists come out as more nearly
right than empiricists (Segal, 2008, p. 91).
If this is true, dom and any other grammatically realised animate-
inanimate distinction like the ’imasu’/’arimasu’ distinction in Japanese
are innate as well, because they are grammatical features. The argu-
ment for this is standard (this is an adapted version of the argument
in Segal, 2008):
1. All normal first-language speakers of Spanish and Japanese
acquire dom or the ‘imasu’/‘arimasu’ distinction during their
childhood.
2. Children acquire dom or the ‘imasu’/‘arimasu’ distinction via
general purpose learning mechanisms (viz. induction, abduction,
deduction, perception, statistical inference, conditioning) or those
features are, at least partially, innate.
3. The stimuli are too poor to provide children with the empirical
basis sufficient for acquiring dom or the ‘imasu’/‘arimasu’ distinc-
tion.
4. Children do not learn dom or the ‘imasu’/‘arimasu’ distinction
via general purpose learning mechanisms.
5. dom or the ‘imasu’/‘arimasu’ distinction are, at least partially
innate.
The reason why premise 3 holds is that the evidence for syntactic
structures in general is strong enough that it seems safe to assume it
true for dom or the imasu/arimasu distinction.7 Now suppose that 1)
syntax constrains referring expressions, because only well-formed ex-
pressions can refer at all and that 2) a syntactic distinction between
living and non-living beings will inform every explicit reference to




living and non-living being. Under these assumptions, we can hold,
tentatively approximating Hinzen’s position, that the conceptual ca-
pacity to distinguish between living and non-living is somehow in-
scribed into the innate capacity to build grammatically well-formed
sentences. It does not really matter if the conceptual distinction has,
maybe even after a genuine learning process, informed the lexicon
from which the syntactic operations construct grammatical sentences
containing dom or the ‘imasu’/‘arimasu’ distinction. What matters
is that the conceptual distinction informs the generating process of
linguistic content without any influence from experience during the
generating.
This amounts to the commitment that there are two categorically
different ways of referring to objects: one relates a name and a living
being (e.g., ‘neko’ and cats), the other a name and an object (e.g.,
‘kasa’ and umbrella). It also entails that the syntactic distinction is
innate in native speakers of English, even though it does not show up
in the structure of actual sentences in English. How does that help
in finding a counterexample for the conception of judgement that is
implied by Crude Semantic Realism?
If the linguistic consideration is correct, expressing the thought
‘The cat is a living being’ in any language is, under the assumption
that ‘The cat’ actually refers, the sort of counterexample we need.
Grammar tells us that forming a sentence about any cat must in-
volve that cats are living beings; if the predicate is ‘is a living being’,
the sentence is true in virtue of its grammatical form whenever its
subject ‘The cat’ actually refers to a cat. Meaning that the cat is
a living being by saying so is a case which Crude Semantic Realism
cannot handle, because it poses an a priori independence between
constitution of content and its interpretation. It is the sort of coun-
terexample needed against Hattiangadi.
The linguistic examples and their interpretation suggest that sen-
tences are not only true because they successfully track states of
affairs (and simply reflect them). It seems that truth does also de-
pend, at least partially, on a structural affinity between sentences
and states of affairs: of actual cats being living things in every state
of affairs and in every linguistic content we form in order to refer to
actual cats.
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The problem for Crude Semantic Realism is clear: by stripping off
all normative force from the word-referent relation it became possible
to relocate the source of correctness in the syntactic constitution of
semantic content and states of affairs rather than in their relation.
Doing so showed us that there are meaningful sentences, like ‘The
cat is a living being’ (when referring to an actual cat), where we
cannot uphold the sort of independence between content and states
of affairs upon which any Semantic Realism is built. We can now
argue that Crude Semantic Realism cannot explain the meaning of
certain grammatical sentences which obviously do have a meaning.
I shall elaborate this point in the next section.
IV Explaining the Possibility of Meaning
Meaning φ by saying ‘φ’ can be explained in different ways. It
was assumed here that trying to find the right meaning-facts is a
good strategy. Crude Semantic Realism adduces one sort of fact:
meaning φ by ‘φ’ amounts to whether ‘φ’ refers to a property which
is part of a possible state of affairs that actually obtains or not. The
crucial word here is ’refers’. Any spawn of Classical Realism gives
reference a prime role.
How does Crude Semantic Realism explain meaning? The expla-
nation it proposes seems to be complete once one has a conception of
reference which does not entail any normative properties or relations
and according to which reference is supposed to be primitive and also
the right meaning fact. Does this suffice? The crucial point is that
it can be questioned whether this view can account for the consti-
tution of semantic content and the state of affairs it corresponds
to: reference presupposes that there is a ‘φ’ which can be related
to some property which partakes in a (possible) state of affairs. In
other words, by assuming that reference is primitive, Crude Seman-
tic Realism cannot explain how reference is possible at all: it cannot
fend of calls for reducing reference to some further fact, as claiming a
primitive notion of reference is not based on the claim that meaning
is normative and, hence, irreducible. Now, under the assumption
that there is no such thing as semantic normativity, any explanation
of how ‘reference’ is be understood here would contain an account of
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what can be related and how such a relation works—but it turned
out (in section 2) that different things are related in different ways.
Suggesting, as the definition presented in section 1 does, that some
paradigmatic sort of word referent relation is the right prototype
does, hence, not suffice.
Crude Semantic Realism is no full-fledged factualism about mean-
ing, because it does not offer us a story about how the (allegedly)
relevant meaning-fact constitutes meaning. The argument that deny-
ing this leads to a contradiction is rather simple (note, premise 4
results from the interpretation of the linguistic consideration):
1. Crude Semantic Realism is a factualism about meaning.
2. Every factualism about meaning assumes some basic fact.
3. Classical Semantic Realism assumes reference as the basic fact.
4. Reference in Crude Semantic Realism is not a basic fact, because
it must partially rely on how linguistic content is syntactically
constrained.
5. Therefore, Crude Semantic Realism is not a Classical Semantic
Realism.
6. Therefore, Crude Semantic Realism is not a factualism about
meaning.
The way out is to provide a suitable basic fact. I have, follow-
ing Hinzen, suggested that working out the syntactic constraints on
the correct application of terms can turn out to close the gap. A
positive account of how linguistic content is generated can explain
the structural affinities between content and states of affairs that
the realistic doctrine of independent constitution has problems with.
Meaning-theories based on an understanding of generative syntax
are readily available and it is unclear why the Crude Semantic Re-
alist should not want to join that camp.8 If such an assimilation is
8Cf. Larson and Segal (1995) for how to assimilate truth-conditional semantics
to Universal Grammar. See also Pietroski (2005) for a more recent proposal.
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accepted and worked out in detail, some refined version of Seman-
tic Realism might become possible—but choosing a crude version as
one’s starting point misses the real issue.
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